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THE BREMEN, COGSA AND THE PROBLEM
OF CONFLICTING INTERPRETATION

CharlesL. Black, Jr.*

All aspects of the important Bremen decision' will be explored in
these Comments and elsewhere. I propose to present just two ideas,
without needless connective verbal tissue between them: I. The
Bremen case has nothing to do with the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act
(COGSA); 2 both choice-of-forum and choice-of-law clauses should
continue to be invalidated in bills of lading subject to that Act. II. The
best solution for international conflicts of interpretation as to COGSA
(and doubtless as to other statutes based on international conventions)
would be an international court of appeals, exercising a discretionary
jurisdiction, but empowered to affirm or reverse the judgments of
national courts on these points of interpretation.'
I.

THE BREMEN AND COGSA

The Bremen decision does not purport to touch COGSA cases:
"That Act is not applicable in this case." 4 The question must then be
whether there are good grounds in law for invalidating choice-offorum and choice-of-law clauses in bills of lading covered by COGSA,
even if it be assumed that such clauses (at least choice-of-forum
clauses) are correctly dealt with in Bremen. My answer is in the
affirmative. The right answer for choice-of-forum clauses very much
depends on the answer for choice-of-law clauses. It is best, therefore,
to begin with the latter.
The bold-faced fact here is that the United States COGSA literally
stipulates that it shall be the law applicable to all bills of lading in
* Luce Professor of Jurisprudence, Yale Law School. B.A., 1935, M.A., 1938,
University of Texas; LL.B., 1943, Yale Law School.

1. The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
2. 46 U.S.C. § § 1300-15 (1970).
3. I have been putting this idea before classes at the Yale Law School for
several years, and have had much interesting comment and reaction from students.
I must particularly mention Richard Grande, Esq., a student at the Yale Law
School, 1971-72, who became especially interested and worked on the subject in
seminar. While I benefited greatly from discussions with him, he is in no way
responsible for my conclusions or reasonings herein.
4. 407 U.S. at 10 n.11.
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United States foreign trade, inbound or outbound. That is what the
enacting clause says:
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
States of America in Congress assembled, That every bill of lading or similar

document of title which is evidence of a contract for the carriage of goods
by sea to or from ports of the United States, in foreign trade, shall have
effect subject to the provisions of this Act.5
It is hard to think there is any room for construction here. What is
stated is a conflicts norm, choosing the substantive sections of the
United States COGSA as the law of the described bills. Since it can
hardly be argued that Congress has in general no power to enact a
conflicts norm as part of the regulation of "Commerce with foreign
Nations" (an argument which would quite incomprehensibly elevate
the whole elusive subject of "choice of law" to a constitutional level)
the question, essentially one of due process, must be whether the
conflicts norm chosen by our COGSA is so unreasonable as to be
merely arbitrary. Plainly, this is not so; the bills of lading covered by
the Act have a most substantial connection with the United States.
I would think the choice-of-law clause matter might well end right
there. But it cannot hurt to go just a little way into the supportive context and background.
As to context, the main item is COGSA section 3(8), which forbids
the "lessening" of the carrier's obligation as imposed by COGSA's
other sections. 6 A stipulation for foreign law must have the effect of
lessening carrier liability, or it is valueless to the carrier who inserted
it, and the denial of its benefits does no harm to him.7 But the
proferring of this contextual support should not be taken to imply
that there is any way but one to interpret the plain language of the
enacting clause.
As to background, it is notorious that the Harter Act,8 ancestral to
COGSA, was passed just exactly to prevent the application of foreign
law, especially British law, to shipments in or out of the United

5. 49 Stat. 1207 (1936), 46 U.S.C. § 1300 (1970).
6. 46 U.S.C. § 1303(8) (1970).
7. I omit discussion of the case in which the stipulation could be shown to be
of benefit to the bill of lading holder. It seems fair, in the light of the whole
history of the subject, and of the adhesory nature of the bill, to assume that
carriers' benefit is usually sought, and that, when the holder seeks to avoid the
clause, it is not for his benefit. In any case, it would seem the holder waives his
benefit, if any, by bringing suit in the American court.
8. 46 U.S.C. § § 190-96 (1970).
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States.9 Like COGSA, the Harter Act stated a conflicts as well as a
substantive norm. Section 1, for example, said:
It shall not be lawful for the manager, agent, master, or owner of any vessel
transporting merchandise or property from or between ports of the United
States and foreign ports to insert in any bill of lading or shipping document
any clause, covenant, or agreement whereby it, he, or they shall be relieved
from liability for loss or damage arising from negligence, fault, or failure in
proper loading, stowage, custody, care, or proper delivery of any and all
lawful merchandise or property committed to its or their charge. Any and
all words or clauses of such import inserted in bills of lading or shipping
receipts shall be null and void and of no effect.10
This language is inartful but clear; in its inartful clarity it states just
the same conflicts norm as does COGSA, so far as bills of lading in
inbound or outbound foreign trade are concerned.
The Harter Act was explicitly so interpreted, and the power of
Congress to make the conflicts choice upheld, in Knott v. Botany
Mills, decided in 1900.11 The carriage was inbound to New York from
Buenos Aires, in a British vessel; the bill of lading stipulation was for
British law. The Court, holding that the Harter Act governed, spoke
tersely but sufficiently: "The power of Congress to'include such cases
'12
in this enactment cannot be denied in a court of the United States.
It is astounding that Knott has played so little part in modern
discussion of the COGSA choice-of-law question. Unless one can drive
a wedge between the Harter Act language and that of COGSA's
enacting clause (and one cannot do so, unless it be by noting that
COGSA is a little more elegant than Harter on the conflicts point),
this case should have been the ruling case, entirely settling the
invalidity of choice-of-law clauses, both for Harter and for COGSA
bills. My own hunch is that the very terseness and compression of the
above quoted sentence resulted in its standing almost unnoticed
through decades, though plainly right and controlling. Alas, sometimes
a court has to spread it thin, worry it a lot, even say it three times,
before it will be taken seriously.

9. A. KNAUTH, THE AMERICAN LAW OF OCEAN BILLS OF LADING
120 (4th ed. 1953).
10. 46 U.S.C. § 190 (1970).
11. 179 U.S. 69 (1900). The deliberateness of this holding is underscored by
the fact that the Supreme Court chose the Harter Act ground, in affirming a
Second Circuit decision wherein the Circuit Court's opinion had held it
unnecessary to reach this ground. See Botany Worsted Mills v. Knott, 82 F. 471,
473 (2d Cir. 1897).
12. 179 U.S. at 74.
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The law seems, then, to be clear: COGSA makes the "choice of
law"-its own substantive law-for inbound and outbound bills in
United States foreign trade. As a work of supererogation, one might
note that, whatever may be the case in towage contracts, almost all
bills of lading are boilerplate contracts of purest adhesion; all the
statutory law dealing with them starts from the policy premise that
their holders need protection from the overreaching of their utterers.
If COGSA spoke with less clarity, it might be worthwhile to go
through this thousand-times-told tale. As it is, we do not even need to
worry about "contacts," "factors," "reasonableness" or any of the
other things that conflicts people like to talk about. Congress has done
that work for us, in the COGSA enacting clause.
If the choice-of-law clause is invalid, the double way to invalidity of
the choice-of-forum clause is clear. First, to force a shipper to sue in a
foreign court is to take away from him all assurance that he will enjoy
the protection of any provision of the American COGSA. The
conflicts norm stated in our COGSA is not binding on any foreign
court, as thee Supreme Court, in the Knott days of terse sufficiency,
implied in the sentence quoted above. A Swedish court, for example,
may respect a choice-of-law clause stipulating for Swedish law; indeed,
it will very likely do so in a case involving shipment from or to
Sweden. Even without a choice-of-law clause, the Swedish court's own
conflicts rules may quite properly lead to a choice of Swedish law; the
American Congress's choice-of-law norm, like the "common law"
choice-of-law norm of an American court, cannot bind the Swedish
judiciary. The Knott statement 13 was precise, in its inclusion and in
its limits. It results that a choice-of-forum clause, in a bill covered by
our COGSA, must be held, in an American court, directly to violate
our COGSA's enacting clause, since the enforcement of the choice-offorum clause, by dismissal of the American suit, puts the litigant into
the power of a court which may or may not see to it that the
command of our COGSA is followed, or that any particular provision
or interpretation of our COGSA is given effect. 4
Secondly, on the level of sheer practicality, it is hard to see how it
can be looked on as other than a "lessening" of the carrier's liability
under COGSA to remit the bill of lading holder to a distant foreign
court. It is quite true that the difficulty imposed would vary with
circumstances; Canada is not Pakistan. But there is always some

13. Id.
14. For interesting and artful uses of these clauses, innocent as they may
appear, see the section, "Methods of Evasion of the Acts," in A. KNAUTH. supra
note 9, at 161 et seq.
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palpable "lessening," for if the choice-of-forum clause is ever
enforced, the result must be to dismiss the litigant out of the United
States court he has chosen to sue in. On most moderate-sized claims,
remission to the foreign forum is a practical immunization of the
carrier from liability. I hope we have not relapsed into such arid
conceptualism as to make anything of the classification of this
practical "lessening" as "procedural" rather than "substantive."
I would conclude, then, that the American courts are bound to hold
choice-of-forum and choice-of-law clauses invalid in COGSA bills,
inbound or outbound, for reasons specially applicable to COGSA
(because they arise from its text) and not shaken by Bremen. The
latter case does not require the Supreme Court to overrule, either
literally or in effect, either the considered holdings of two of the best
5
or its own four-square precedent in
admiralty Courts of Appeals,"
6
Mills.1
Knott v. Botany
II.

THE

PROBLEM OF CONFLICTING INTERPRETATION

It remains lamentable that there should be so much advantage in
choice of law or choice of forum, after the long efforts toward
"unification" represented by COGSA. Leaving aside minor textual
differences among the Acts of the different nations, the trouble is that
the technique for producing uniformity in the world's bill of lading
law-the technique of procuring agreement on a text-is fatally
defective; a text must be interpreted, and interpretations will surely
diverge. No one can read the American COGSA cases-on deviation,
on the Both-to-Blame Clause, on the definition of a "package" and so
on-without becoming aware that only direct Providential guiding of
the judicial hand could produce uniformity of interpretation among
Israel, Barbados, Belgium and Egypt.
Palliatives might be suggested. It might be worthwhile to translate
into several languages, and make widely available, all judicial decisions
on the Hague Rules." Judges in all countries might then at least be
enabled to behave in responsibility to the fact that, in interpreting the
national legislation implementing the Rules, they are interpreting a
text that was meant to produce international uniformity of result. (I
have had many American COGSA cases under my eyes; I do not recall
one in which the discussion or the decision was in any way influenced
15. Indussa Corp. v. S.S. Ranborg, 377 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1967) (en banc);
Carbon Black Export, Inc. v. The S.S. Monrosa, 254 F.2d 297 (5th Cir. 1958),
writ of cert. dismissed, 359 U.S. 180 (1959).
16. 179 U.S. 69 (1900).
17. I owe this suggestion, excellent in itself, to my colleague Professor W. M.
Reisman.
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by awareness of the unifying aim of COGSA, and of the Hague Rules
behind it.)
I do not think that would be enough. It never has been enough as
amongst our federal Courts of Appeals, with respect to interpretations
of federal law texts.
No one who knows anything about the inertia of movements
toward international agreement on texts would see any hope in
continual piecemeal amendment of the Hague Rules, followed by
corresponding national statutory change.
There is one way-the way we have here solved the problem
mentioned in the last paragraph but one. I think it is the only way to
insure a satisfactory ongoing approximation to uniformity in the
actual working law of ocean bills. Let me pass over altogether, for a
moment, the questions of political feasibility and of constitutionality.
I will then say that the solution would have to be a single international
court of appeals, whereto judgments interpreting COGSA, rendered in
the national courts of last resort, could be brought by the nonprevailing party. Such a court should control its own jurisdiction; appeals to
it should be heard at its discretion, as with our own Supreme Court's
certiorari procedure, for much non-uniformity is trivial or at least
tolerable, like some intercircuit differences in our system. But, on
application by a party, the court should have the power to take up
and to decide any case hinging on the interpretation of COGSA.
Let me return now to the hard questions passed over above.
Are we politically ready for this international court? Probably
not-but if not, we are not ready for real international uniformity in
the effective law of ocean bills of lading--or in any other part of
international commercial law. I cannot answer this political question; I
am acting here on the thought that the only way to start finding out
the answer is to put the idea forward and see what happens. (I would
only say that provisions for easy and short-notice denunciation and
withdrawal might somewhat help to procure acceptance.)
Could the United States constitutionally assent to a binding review
of the COGSA-interpreting judgments of its own Supreme Court (or
its Courts of Appeals, in cases in which our Supreme Court denies
certiorari) by an international private-law tribunal, whose appellate
jurisdiction would be invoked by private litigants? I would answer
"yes," though I will do no more here than sketch the bare outlines of
two theories leading to this answer.
First, the treaty power has already been held to be an
independent source of national empowerment, supplementing and
going beyond article I, section 8.18 I would think that the treaty
18. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
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power might just as well be held to stand in the same relation to
article III, so as to provide for additional "vesting" of judicial
jurisdiction, or, in the perhaps less disturbing alternative, so as to fill
out the "exceptions and regulations" power expressly given to
Congress, with respect to the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction.
A direction to the Supreme Court to obey in COGSA cases the
mandate of the COGSA court of appeals might be held an article III
"regulation" made by the exercise of the treaty power, or by
legislation passed to execute the treaty. Indeed, even if self-executing,
the treaty should be duplicated and reinforced (just as the substantive
parts of treaties are often duplicated and reinforced) by congressional
action of conforming tenor, particularly since no such step as the one
I am suggesting should be taken without clearly expressed congressional concurrence.
Secondly, Congress possesses broad power to regulate foreign
commerce. The step I propose is beyond doubt reasonably instrumental, in fact, to the facilitation of foreign commerce; certainly, its
possession of this character is within the scope of rational congressional judgment. Here again, a "regulation" of foreign commerce
might be at the same time a "regulation" of the Supreme Court's
exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.
It could go without saying (though it has often been said) that
neither the treaty power nor the commerce power can be used to do
anything forbidden by the Constitution.1 9 Quite obviously, the usual
Bill of Rights material (including article I, section 9 material, and the
like) is in no intrinsic way implicated here; if it ever became
accidentally implicated, our own Supreme Court could and should
mould its own judgment and mandate accordingly, for it would then
be faced with a situation in which the treaty setting up the
international court had, in its workings, gone where the treaty power
cannot go, or with a situation in which the commerce power had gone
onto forbidden ground. The only prohibitions one needs to worry
about lie in the possible implications of article III: "The judicial
Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and
in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain
and establish." 2
Would the consent of the United States to the work of an
international court of appeals, acting only on international commercial cases involving treaty interpretation, violate the implications
of these words? I think not. Within the United States, there would still

19. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
20. U.S. CONST. art. Il, § 1.
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be "one supreme Court."2 1 The judgments of the international court
of appeals could work only through that "one supreme Court." Our
Supreme Court could, first of all, decide whether the whole
arrangement was constitutional, by obeying or disobeying the first
mandate it received from the new court, reversing one of its
judgments. (I am assuming that no one would think it either
politically possible or wise to give the international court any coercive
power to enforce its judgments in the United States or elsewhere.) Our
Supreme Court would permanently have the power (and the duty) to
refuse to obey any mandate producing, in its own independent
judgment, any violation of the Bill of Rights, or other prohibitory
material in our Constitution (or even in laws subsequent to the
consenting treaty). The question whether a treaty (or the working-out
of a treaty) violates our Constitution, or transgresses law which under
our system prevails over the treaty, is not a question of COGSA
interpretation, and would not (and I think could not) be taken from
any American court, in cases within that court's judicial jurisdiction.
The practical substance of the matter would be no more than a
definite but not fatally diverging variation on Congress's everyday
power to give the Supreme Court rules of decision in statute law (or
on the power of the treaty-making organs to give the courts rules of
decision by treaty). 2 Congress has done this, for example, in
COGSA. Congress could do it every day, by amending COGSA, and
could, if it wished, shape this daily amendment in strict conformity to
the advisory judgments of an international court sitting in Switzerland-or even in strict conformity to the expressed opinions of some
leading jurisconsult. In the arrangement I am proposing, Congress (or
the treaty-forming organs, or both) would be saying that, when the
rule of decision must be derived by interpretation of COGSA, that
rule shall ultimately be found by reference to the judgment of the
international court of appeals.2 3 This would imply that the
judgments of our Supreme Court were in these matters to be tentative,
until the interpretation of COGSA on the disputed point was finally
firmed by the international court (though of course an unappealed
judgment, or one as to which the international court "denied
certiorari," would be res judicata). This is different from anything we
now do, but I cannot see that it is unconstitutionally different-

21. Herein lies the crucial difference between the proposal here presented
and the now much-discussed "National Court of Appeals"--both as a matter of
constitutional law and as a matter of wise policy.
22. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.

23. Cf. United States v. Sharpnack, 355 U.S. 286 (1958).
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particularly since it is so fairly instrumental to the just and uniform

regulation of foreign commerce.
On this analysis, the only difference between daily or hourly
amendment of COGSA, an undoubtedly permissible procedure, and a
congressional direction that the Supreme Court give effect to the
interpretations made from time to time by the international court,
would be that, theoretically, the latter procedure, in reference to the
actually appealed case, might be thought to entail a forbidden
retroactivity. I have said "theoretically" because in fact no firm
expectations can be (or at least ought to be) built on the prelitigation
resolution, by parties' counsel, of genuine issues of statutory
interpretation, and there would in actual substance be no more
"retroactivity" in the Supreme Court's acting on the international
court's interpretations of doubtful provisions than there now is in the
Supreme Court's acting on its own interpretations of such provisions.
If a case of so really outrageous surprise occurred as to amount to a
violation of due process, our Supreme Court would have the power
and the duty to disobey the mandate, since the Court could never
surrender or be stripped of its power to give effect to the American
Constitution, in cases before it. It seems unlikely that such a case
would occur.
I think this is a modest proposal, and that not in the Swiftian sense.
Practically, the step would constitute no more than an implementation (close to "necessary," as well as "proper") of the entirely
legitimate interest of the United States (as of all countries) in the
uniformity of international commercial law. If there is an altogether
different way in which this uniformity-in result as well as in
text-could be achieved, I would be glad to hear what it is.
Of course, the scheme I have here put forward could be applied to
other subjects than the Hague Rules and COGSA. I have used COGSA
simply as a paradigm. And I have only sketched the proposal, so as to
have it in the open for comment. Perhaps an international commercial
court of appeals, accessible to private litigants, will be possible no
sooner than fifty years from now, or even a hundred. But we can start
thinking about it today.
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